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The District Court Erred By Holding That The Preliminary Hearing Testimony Of 
Robeli Bauer Was Not Admissible At Richardson's Trial 
A. Introduction 
Application of the correct legal standards to the facts found by the district 
court shows that the district court erred by ordering the exclusion from trial of the 
preliminary hearing testimony of Robert Bauer. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-7.) 
Richardson argues that this Court should apply a "clear error" standard to the 
entirety of the lower court's ruling, which, he says, is entirely factual. 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 7-9.) This argument fails because, even though the 
district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, the appellate courts of 
Idaho freely review the trial court's application of the law to the facts. Such free 
review shows that the district court employed an incorrect legal standard, and 
that application of the correct legal standard shows the testimony was 
admissible. Richardson next asserts that the lower court's ruling should be 
affirmed on an accusation that the prosecutor acted unethically. (Respondent's 
brief, pp. 9-10.) This argument is reckless and specious. Finally, Richardson 
advocates for a bright-line rule that failure to disclose the name of a witness prior 
to the preliminary hearing will always result in the exclusion at trial of any 
testimony by that witness given at the preliminary hearing. (Respondent's brief, 
pp. 10-11.) There is no legal merit to this argument. 
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B. The Clear Error Standard Applies Only To The District Court's Factual 
Findings, And Not Its Application Of The Law To Those Facts 
It is axiomatic that the application of law to the facts of a particular issue is 
conducted by an appellate court de novo and without deference to the lower 
court. EJL, ==~~~== 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011) 
("When faced with a mixed question of fact and law, the Court will defer to the 
district court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, but will 
exercise free review over the application of the relevant law to those facts"); Cit-y 
of Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 574, 576, 237 P.3d 1200, 1202 (2010) 
("This Court exercises free review of the district court's application of the relevant 
law to the facts."); Gosch v. State, 154 Idaho 71, 73, 294 P.3d 197, 199 (Ct. App. 
2012) ("The appellate court exercises free review of the district court's 
application of the law to the facts."). It was the application of improper legal 
standards that resulted in reversible error in this case. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-
7.) 
In this case the district court found that Bauer testified at the preliminary 
hearing, where he was cross-examined; that Bauer's name was not disclosed in 
formal discovery until the hearing; and that Bauer died before trial. (R., pp. 1-2, 
4.) The only finding of fact even arguably disputed is whether Richardson in fact 
knew that Bauer was the confidential informant prior to the preliminary hearing. 
(Compare R., p. 151 with Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8.) The district court 
considered this question "speculative," which was clearly erroneous in light of the 
overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence that Richardson in fact knew to 
whom he sold the methamphetamine in question. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8.) 
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Although reversing the one clear error in the facts certainly supports the 
state's argument, it is ultimately the legal error that requires reversal of the 
district court's order. The district court's primary determination was that the 
failure to formally disclose the name of the witness in discovery meant that 
cross-examination was an "investigatory tool" instead of being used to "impeach 
the witness." (R., p. 151.) This distinction between impeachment and discovery, 
however, is legally irrelevant. The Idaho Court of Appeals, addressing the 
admissibility of preliminary hearing testimony, noted that "in practice discovery to 
which the defendant is ultimately entitled will frequently be incomplete or even 
nonexistent at the time of the preliminary hearing." State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 
856, 861, 840 P.2d 400, 405 (Ct. App. 1992) (internal quotations omitted). Such 
"practical realities" are not the focus of the relevant legal inquiry, however. ~ at 
861-62, 840 P.2d at 405-06 (internal quotation omitted). Rather, the focus is on 
"the scope and nature of the opportunity for cross-examination permitted by the 
court." ~ at 861, 840 P.2d at 406 (emphasis added, internal quotation omitted). 
Indeed, adequacy of the opportunity for cross-examination is focused on whether 
the opportunity for cross-examination was sufficient to lead to the "discovery of 
truth." State v. Mantz, 148 Idaho 303, 306, 222 P.3d 471, 474 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970)). 
Richardson acknowledges that there was no limitation whatsoever 
imposed on cross-examination by the magistrate at the preliminary hearing. 
(Appellant's brief p. 5.) What both Richardson and the district court fail to 
acknowledge, however, is that cross-examination focused on discovery of the 
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truth was fulfilling its function, not failing therein. By focusing on the extent of 
pre-hearing discovery, rather than on whether Richardson had the opportunity to 
discover the truth through cross-examination without limitations by the 
magistrate, the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard. 
The extent of discovery is also of marginal, if any, relevance to the motive 
for cross-examination. Like in this case, in Ricks counsel for the defendant 
claimed that he had simply engaged in discovery when cross-examining the 
witness at the preliminary hearing. Ricks, 122 Idaho at 864, 840 P .2d at 408. 
The factors to be applied, however, included the "similarity of the party's 
position," the "purpose sought to be accomplished in the cross-examination," and 
whether a thorough cross-examination could be "reasonably expected." !9..c 
(internal quotes omitted). Because the factual issues to be addressed in both 
the preliminary hearing and the trial were "exactly the same" and the "alignment 
of the parties in relation to each other and to the witness [was] exactly the same," 
it could not be said "convincingly" that the defendant "had no similar motive for 
cross-examination at the preliminary hearing and at triaL" !9..c at 864, 840 P.2d at 
408. Rather, it "would be to the defendant's benefit" to reduce the effectiveness 
of the witness' testimony through cross-examination at both proceedings. !9..c at 
864-65, 840 P.2d at 408-09. Ultimately, developing Bauer's testimony through 
cross-examination at the preliminary hearing in order to provide impeachment at 
trial and conducting the same impeachment through cross-examination at trial 
are, if not identical, at least "similar" motives. Id.; State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 
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936, 935 P.2d 183, 199 (Ct. App. 1997) (near identity of issues 
motives for cross-examination). 
similar 
More recently, the Idaho Court of Appeals has stated, "The new and 
significantly material line of cross-examination principle [applied in Confrontation 
challenges] is related to the 'similar motive' element of !.R.E. 804(b)(1 )." Mantz, 
148 Idaho at 311, 222 P.3d at 479. Tellingly, the district court did not find a 
material line of cross-examination that was not addressed in the preliminary 
hearing. (Appellant's brief, pp 5-6.) Nor does Richardson suggest one on 
appeal. (See, generally, Respondent's brief.) That counsel managed to cross-
examine Bauer on every topic that would have been addressed through cross-
examination at trial is strong evidence indeed that the motivation for cross-
examination at the preliminary hearing was at least similar to the motivation for 
cross-examination at trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-6.) "Counsel's motive at trial 
was the same as at the preliminary hearing, to prove [the defendant's] innocence 
by discrediting [the witness's] testimony." Mantz, 148 Idaho at 311, 222 P.3d at 
479. 
The district court employed an analysis contrary to the applicable legal 
standards. Application of the correct legal standards to the facts found by the 
district court shows reversible error. The error is even more pronounced when 
the clearly erroneous factual finding that Richardson had no notice in fact of 
Bauer's identity is corrected. Richardson's claim that the entirety of the district 
court's decision is a factual finding is meritless. Because application of the 
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correct legal standards shows that Bauer's preliminary hearing testimony is 
admissible, reversal is warranted in this case. 
C. Richardson's Alternative Arguments Range From Meritless To Specious 
The district court articulated no alternative grounds for its ruling. (R., pp. 
148-52.) Richardson presents two alternative grounds. First, he asserts the 
prosecutor violated her ethical duties by not revealing Bauer's name earlier. 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 9-10.) In addition to being irrelevant, this argument is 
specious. The identity of the confidential informant was privileged. I.R.E. 
509(1). The state was not required to provide the name of the informant unless 
and until the state elected to call him as a witness. I.R.E. 509(2). Nothing in the 
record suggests the prosecutor delayed making the decision to call Bauer, and 
thus disclose his name, to gain an advantage over Richardson. Indeed, the 
prosecutor would have to have had foreknowledge of Bauer's death in order to 
believe she would gain a trial advantage from the timing of the disclosure of 
Bauer's name. Richardson's counsel's assertion the prosecutor was "gaming" 
the system is both reckless and specious. 
Richardson lastly argues for a bright-line test that would exclude all 
preliminary hearing testimony of unavailable witnesses unless the name of the 
witness was disclosed in discovery prior to the preliminary hearing. 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 10-11.) He cites no legal authority for this argument. 
(Id.) His proposed test is not found in the language of the statute. I.C. § 9-336. 
It is not in the applicable rule of evidence. I.R.E. 804(b)(1). It has apparently 
been adopted by no court addressing the Confrontation Clause. Finally, his 
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proposal for a bright-line test is not only absent from legal authority, it is contrary 
to prior precedent. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856, 861-62, 840 P.2d 400, 405-06 
(admissibility not determined by "incomplete or even nonexistent [discovery] at 
the time of the preliminary hearing"). This request for a bright-line rule is without 
merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the district court's order finding the 
transcript of Bauer's preliminary hearing testimony inadmissible be reversed and 
that the case remanded for trial or other further proceedings. 
DATED this 4th day of Novemb , 013. 
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